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ABSTRACT
Based on a case study of the so-called ‘Kafferskraal’ land claim, this arti-
cle scrutinizes the ongoing land restitution process in post-apartheid South
Africa with regard to its capacity to provide a transition towards ‘justice’.
After sketching the legal and institutional set-up of land restitution, the jus-
tice of the actual restitution process is explored with reference to conflicting
interpretations by various actors involved in this exemplary case. Here, a fo-
cus on divergent understandings of what historically constituted valid rights
in land as well as forms of past compensation reveals continuing discrepan-
cies regarding the legitimacy of various property regimes. These differences,
leading to divergent evaluations of ‘the justice’ of this claim’s final outcome,
are shown to be ultimately rooted in incompatible logics of exceptional-
ity and the ordinary, which conceive of land restitution in terms of either
‘law making’ or ‘law preserving’. The article concludes with a discussion of
the implications of such a configuration of land restitution as a measure of
transitional justice.
INTRODUCTION
Onemorning in October 2010, I was sitting in the living room of a farmhouse
near the settlement of Stoffberg, northeast of Pretoria, SouthAfrica.Myhosts
were the Botha family who had been party to the legal dispute regarding the
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so-called ‘Kafferskraal’ land claim.1 At the time, I was collecting data for
a research project about the ongoing South African land restitution process,
through which the state compensates former victims of land dispossession
on racial grounds. For this research, I selected a number of exemplary land
claim cases, talked to representatives of all parties involved, checked court
files and engaged in participant observation on the farms and in the Land
Claims Court. Since the ‘Kafferskraal’ case was one of them, I had arranged
to meet the Botha family on that day, and we discussed their experiences
regarding this particular restitution case. Portion 3 of the ‘Kafferskraal’ farm
had been owned by the Botha family since the late nineteenth century, as was
proven when I was shown their historical title deed and cadastral map, dating
back to 1893. As a matter of fact, the farm had already been in possession
of the family since it was first granted in private ownership in 1872, as the
Bothas were also matrilaterally related to the first white2 owner, Abraham
Johannes Korf.
While the Bothas agreed that land which had been taken unlawfully in
the past should now be restituted to the former owner, they questioned the
validity of the ‘Kafferskraal’ land claim, since South African land restitution
(as we will see below) only deals with dispossessions after 1913. So how
could anybody have been dispossessed in terms of current restitution
legislation, I was rhetorically asked, if their portion 3 had continuously been
in the family’s possession long before 1913? Therefore, the Botha family,
together with the Prinsloo family owning portion 2 of ‘Kafferskraal’, had
legally challenged the validity of the land claim in the Land Claims Court
and, subsequently, in the Supreme Court of Appeal. However, on both
occasions, they lost. By the time of our meeting, the state had already
bought the respective portions from both families and handed them over to
the claimant community. The Bothas stressed forcefully that they still felt
the judgments neither to be just nor to follow what they regarded as ‘the
law’. Mr Botha Jnr expressed this strong sense of injustice by claiming that
the state is ‘creating a situation for me, in fifty years’ time, to be the next
land claimant, because I’ve been treated unfairly now. So in fifty years’
1. The name of this farm has appeared on successive title deeds since 1872. The word kaffer
is an offensive term for African people and kraal refers to an enclosure for cattle within an
African homestead. As we will see below, however, this fact was recently used to positive
effect by the claimants in court. Given that this name is consistently used in state proceedings
such as court files and judgments, oscillating uncannily between being a seemingly neutral
signifier and representing precisely the racial discrimination which lies at the heart of land
restitution, I stick to it, placing it in quotation marks to highlight its problematic nature.
2. I use the conventions of African, Indian, coloured, black (as inclusive of the previous three
categories) and white to describe the different social groups that were identified as ‘distinct’
under the apartheid system. At the same time, I acknowledge the dilemma the usage of
these socially constructed terms entail, in that they might reinforce notions of their alleged
‘reality’ as being biologically predetermined.
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time, whatever might happen, it’s not impossible that I’ll be the next land
claimant! . . . You cannot fix a mistake with a mistake’.3
Based on a case study of the ‘Kafferskraal’ land claim, this article scru-
tinizes South African land restitution with regard to its capacity to provide
a transition to justice in the post-apartheid era. I thereby consciously refrain
from studying this process with reference to an analytical concept of ‘jus-
tice’ — be it in terms of utilitarianism, libertarianism, fairness, capabilities,
participatory parity, etc.4 Instead, my focus is exclusively on ‘justice’ as it
is emically understood, and constructed, by the actors themselves. ‘Justice’
is thus interpreted in a broad sense as an evolving co-production involving
various actors engaged in negotiating, and putting into practice, the concrete
terms of South Africa’s new beginning with regard to its moral rightness.
The article is premised on the assumption that these discursive and practical
negotiations of justice, as exemplified in land restitution, are strongly influ-
enced by divergent evocations of logics of exceptionality and logics of the
ordinary. Reference to logics of the exception seems inevitably to arouse
associations with the recently somewhat popular Agambian paradigm of
‘sovereignty’ and its foundational ‘state of exception’ (Agamben, 1998,
2005), which builds on the earlier works of Carl Schmitt (1985) and Walter
Benjamin (1996). Given the massive scope of social scientific engagements
with Giorgio Agamben’s state of exception, and the somewhat divergent
focus on exceptionality in this text, I will refrain from discussing Agam-
ben’s critique of sovereignty as such.5 For present purposes, it suffices to
say that Agamben’s exception seems to simultaneously offer too much and
too little. It offers (and asks for) too much in that it ultimately proclaims the
state of exception to be the paradigm of modern government, and the camp,
populated by citizens reduced to ‘bare life’, to be the modern predicament.
Thus downplaying, among others, the difference between liberal democracy
and totalitarian dictatorship — once described by Adorno (2000: 155) as ‘a
total difference’6 — Agamben’s homogenizing and unitary exception also
arguably offers too little. It lets the highly divergent logics of exceptionality
pass unnoticed, which are only possibly and not necessarily centred on law
and the state, and not exclusively evoked by ‘the sovereign’.
By contrast, the notion of variable logics of exceptionality in this article
propagates a more empirically open conception, accommodating a whole
variety of modes, which, from the actor’s point of view, insist on some
profound break with normality, the familiar and the mundane — in short,
the ordinary — that demands and justifies extraordinary measures in excep-
tional times. Correspondingly, proponents of logics of the ordinary insist
3. Interview with members of the Botha family, 11 October 2010.
4. For an overview of different theories of justice, see Brighouse (2004) and Sandel (2010).
5. For an extensive enumeration of recent scholarship on Agambian sovereignty as well as
a critical engagement with the genealogy, and consequences, of Agamben’s approach, see
Jennings (2011).
6. I am indebted to Heins (2005: 860) for this observation.
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on some profound continuity with normality and the mundane which, in
turn, allows reading, and motivating, behaviour in all too familiar terms —
whatever such behaviour may say of itself (see Anders and Zenker, 2014, in
the Introduction to this issue). Seen in this light, singular events may acquire
a different selectivity and connectivity, that is, different pasts and potential
futures (Luhmann, 1995: 215), depending on the peculiar logic(s) through
which they are contextualized. In this way, SouthAfrican land restitution can
be interpreted as evolving through crisscrossing pathways of agency which
—based on divergent logics of exceptionality and the ordinary—bring forth
the peculiar nature of any potential transition to ‘justice’ in post-apartheid
South Africa.
In order to approach the possible justice of South African land restitution
in such terms, the article first sketches the concrete institutional set-up with
reference to the Restitution of Land Rights Act (Act 22 of 1994) and the
constitutional provision for both the protection of private property and the
restitution of land rights. Against this backdrop, ‘the justice’ of the actual
land restitution process is explored with regard to conflicting interpretations
by various sets of actors involved in the ‘Kafferskraal’ land claim, using
data generated in the course of an ongoing research project on South African
land restitution (see Zenker, 2012a, 2012b, forthcoming-a, forthcoming-b,
forthcoming-c). This article focuses on divergent understandings of what
historically constituted valid rights in land and corresponding forms of
compensation in the past. These understandings account for the continuing
discrepancies regarding the legitimacy of various property regimes which, in
turn, inform different evaluations of ‘the justice’ of the final outcome in this
land claim. As is shown, these differences are ultimately rooted in incompati-
ble logics of exceptionality and the ordinary, which conceive land restitution
either in terms of ‘law-making’ or ‘law-preserving violence’ (Benjamin,
1996). The article concludes by discussing the implications of this overall
configuration for land restitution as a measure of ‘transitional justice’.
THE RESTITUTION ACTWITHIN THE LEGAL RECONSTITUTION
OF SOUTH AFRICA
South African land restitution was mandated both by the Interim Con-
stitution of the Republic of South Africa (Act 200 of 1993) and by the
current Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Act 108 of 1996) as
an extraordinary measure, placing the state under a duty to redress land
dispossessions as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices.
The basic criteria and procedures for the restitution process were provided
for by the Restitution of Land Rights Act (Act 22 of 1994). Section 2(1) of
the act provides a set of criteria according to which claimants are entitled
to restitution in the form of either restoration of a right in land or equitable
redress. The claimant could be an individual (or a direct descendant) or a
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community (or part of a community) whose rights in land were derived from
shared rules determining access to land held in common by such a group.
Claims of dispossession of land rights through racially discriminatory laws
and practices could not pre-date 19 June 1913.7 Finally, claimants may not
have received just and equitable compensation (as stipulated in the con-
stitution) for the dispossession at issue and had to lodge their claim before
31 December 1998.8 Significantly, restitution was explicitly not limited to
former freehold ownership of land. Instead, the right in land to be restituted
was defined quite broadly in section 1 of the Restitution Act, including
‘any right in land whether registered or unregistered, and may include the
interest of a labour tenant and sharecropper, a customary law interest, the
interest of a beneficiary under a trust arrangement and beneficial occupation
for a continuous period of not less than 10 years prior to the dispossession
in question’. As we will see in the so-called ‘Kafferskraal’ case, this had
profound consequences for the perceived justice of restitution outcomes.
The Restitution Act further established the Commission on Restitution
of Land Rights, including the Chief Land Claims Commissioner and the
Regional Land Claims Commissioners, as well as the Land Claims Court
(LCC), as its key players. The subsequent examination by the Commission
of lodged claims ultimately validated about 80,000 claims as legitimate and
in need of resolution.9 Since then, commission bureaucrats have mediated
between claimants and usually white landowners in order to settle on a
largely market-oriented agreement, where the state buys the land and, based
on certain conditions, hands it over to the claimants. The minister and, by
delegation, the land claims commissioners, have the power to facilitate and
conclude settlements by agreement. Only claims that cannot be resolved this
way take the judicial route through the LCC. This also entails the possibility
of expropriation — an option that is also constitutionally enshrined (Hall,
2010: 21–32). Based on figures from 2011, about 5 per cent of restitution
claims (that is, 3,673 cases) remain outstanding (Department of Rural De-
velopment and Land Reform, 2011: 40). These cases are typically quite
complex and face numerous challenges for their resolution. Yet, not only
the outstanding restitution claims, but also the officially ‘resolved’ cases
continue to be haunted by many problems (see James, 2007; Walker, 2008;
Walker et al., 2010; Zenker, 2012b, forthcoming-a).
7. This was the date of the proclamation of the Natives Land Act (Act 27 of 1913), first
legalizing massive dispossessions country-wide by introducing racial zones of possible
landownership and by restricting black reserves to only 7 per cent of South African land
(later to be extended to 13 per cent).
8. At the time of writing (February 2014), a Restitution of Land Rights Amendment Bill (B35
of 2013) is undergoing the legislative procedure, reopening the lodgement of land restitution
claims until 31 December 2018.
9. See Zenker (2012a, forthcoming-b) for extensive discussions of the shifting figures within
restitution statistics aswell as their recent transformation into explicit performance indicators
of South African land restitution.
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The history of race-based land dispossession had always occupied an im-
portant position in the African National Congress’s (ANC) understanding of
the liberation struggle (Walker, 2008: 50–1). Political protests, legal battles
and the meticulous documentation of the racially based land dispossessions
and forced removals involving an estimated 3.5 million black people be-
tween 1960 and 1983 (Platzky and Walker, 1985: 10), had constituted key
areas of land activism in and around the ANC for many decades. However,
despite a political rhetoric highlighting the land question, towards the late
1980s rural issues occupied a rather low priority on the ANC’s political
agenda (Klug, 2000: 125). Given the ANC’s general preoccupation with
urban–industrial issues and the strong emphasis on property rights by the
still ruling National Party (NP), especially concerning agricultural land, land
reform became a matter of strategic compromise (Walker, 2008: 54). This
resulted in a balanced constitutional protection of both property rights and
the right to redress for race-based violations of past rights in land; first,
in the Interim Constitution of 1993 (Chaskalson, 1994: 131–2), and then
in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa of 1996 (Klug, 2000:
124–36; Walker, 2008: 50–69). The institutional framework for land resti-
tution needs to be seen within this context of the profound reconstitution
of the overall South African legal order during the transitional negotiations
(Zenker, 2012b).
As Ruth Hall points out, however, both the 1998 deadline for lodging
claims and the 1913 cut-off date, categorically excluding all prior colonial
dispossessions, have been hotly contested (Hall, 2010: 23). Yet until very re-
cently, the government consistently opposed accepting new claims, not least
because this would entail an explosion in costs (ibid.: 24). With regard to the
1913 cut-off date, the ANC government provided an ex-post rationalization
in 1997: it pointed out that given the numerous conflicts between African
groupings prior to 1913, as well as the massive growth and scattered dis-
tribution of the overall African population thereafter, there would be a high
risk of endless inter-ethnic conflict among the dispossessed, were pre-1913
claims to be admitted (Department of Land Affairs, 1997: section 4.14.2); by
contrast post-1913 dispossessions evidently favoured white supremacy. A
further reason for the 1913 deadline can be found in the necessity for political
compromise during the constitutional negotiations, as described above.10
While the 1913 cut-off date has indeed continued to categorically exclude
claims to restitution for pre-1913 dispossessions, it is important to emphasize
10. However, during the State of the Nation Address on 14 February 2013, President Jacob
Zuma announced that the government would re-open the lodgement of land claims and
allow limited exceptions to the 19 June 1913 cut-off date to accommodate claims by the
descendants of theKhoi and San. On 23May 2013, the government published the Restitution
of Land Rights Amendment Bill (B35 of 2013) for public comment, extending the deadline
for lodging new land claims until 31 December 2018. The Explanatory Memorandum
annexed to the Bill declares it to be the government’s intention to deal separately with
pre-1913 land dispossessions as a result of state action.
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that two factors have decisively broadened the scope for land restitution to
actually include cases often assumed in both public debates and the academic
literature to fall outside the jurisdiction of land restitution. First, according
to the above-mentioned broad definition of ‘rights in land’, much more than
merely a loss of freehold land ownership qualifies victims of post-1913 dis-
possessions for an entitlement of restitution. Second, the largely overlooked
jurisprudential role of the courts (Mostert, 2010) has substantially broad-
ened the scope of restitution through redefining ownership in such a way
that many dispossessions are actually conceived as having, indeed, occurred
post-1913. These two aspects constitute core elements underlying the di-
vergent understandings of justice as instantiated by the ‘Kafferskraal’ land
claim.
THE CASE OF THE SO-CALLED ‘KAFFERSKRAAL’ LAND CLAIM: A
HISTORY OF REPOSSESSION
The farm ‘Kafferskraal’ is situated on the edge of the highveld escarpment,
approximately 200 km to the northeast of Pretoria and situated within the
Greater Groblersdal LocalMunicipality,Mpumalanga Province.11 The name
of this farm, measuring about 4,200 hectares, has appeared on successive
title deeds since 1 December 1872, when the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek
(ZAR), also known as the ‘Transvaal Republic’, first granted the land in
private ownership to the white farmer Abraham Johannes Korf. While the
farm name is pejorative, as mentioned above, it signified a fact which was
used in court to positive effect by the claimant community. They argued that
the land had long been settled by black people and that this fact, and related
land rights, survived the superimposition of white registered title.12
The settlement history of the farm and surrounding areas is both crucial for
an understanding of this restitution case and highly contested. For this reason,
I will restrict myself to those historical elements that were more or less taken
for granted by all parties and hence formed the backdrop for the subsequent
legal dispute. In this spirit, a history of this area can be summarized as
follows. During the first half of the nineteenth century, intense competition
characterized the region, as three powerful South African kingdoms — the
Pedi, the Swazi and the Zulu — struggled for dominance. The interplay of
colonial penetration, especially in the form of arriving Boer Voortrekkers in
the 1840s, and the emergence of new African kingdoms, wars and migration
11. This local municipality has been renamed and rezoned into the bordering Limpopo Province.
However, as the farm was still situated in Mpumalanga at the time this claim was processed,
I continue to refer to Mpumalanga Province.
12. See the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal, reported as Prinsloo & Another v.
Ndebele-Ndzundza Community & Others 2005 (6) SA 144 (SCA), section 1.
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in the aftermath of the Difaqane13 sent further shock waves throughout the
region (Delius, 2007: 137). In 1852, Boer settlers established the ZAR in
what later became known as the South African province of ‘Transvaal’,
encompassing the area at issue as its eastern part. In the early decades, ‘the
ZAR was weak and poor and as an administrative, judicial and executive
body it was inefficient’ (Delius andHay, 2009: 51). TheBoers wanted to own
and control the land and further distribute it to white settlers. They attempted
to buy land from various kings and chiefs, occupied pockets of land that did
not fall under the control of any particular chief and subordinated smaller
African chiefdoms and communities. In this process, the ZAR issued title
deeds for what it regarded as its land to the growing number of immigrating
white burghers (citizens) (ibid.: 51–2).
Within this overall context, the Ndebele14 was one local group among
others. Much earlier in their history, they had divided into the two kingdoms
of Manala and Ndzundza (Delius, 1989: 229). While both sections suffered
heavily in the course of the Difaqane, the Ndzundza Ndebele recovered
better, and by the 1840s had re-emerged as a significant kingdom under King
Mabhoko, with various fortifiedmountain strongholds. The coexistence with
the Boers proved conflictual, ‘with the Ndzundza refusing Boer demands for
labour and denying their claims to ownership of the land’ (ibid.). Against a
number of failed Boer attempts to subjugate the kingdom, Ndzundza power
reached its heights in the late 1860s and 1870s. However, substantial changes
were on the way:
The British annexation of the Transvaal in 1877 resulted in a restructuring and strengthening
of the state, and in 1879 a British-led army (with Swazi and Ndzundza assistance) finally
defeated the Pedi paramountcy (i.e. the most powerful African kingdom in the area). As
the balance of power swung away from the African states in the region, landowners and
speculators started to press claims to formerly unoccupied farms and to those which had
been worked only on sufferance of the Ndzundza rulers. Shortly after retrocession (i.e. the
restoration of ZAR independence from Britain in 1881), the Ndzundza and the restored
Republican administration found themselves at loggerheads over competing land claims
and over whether the chiefdom fell under the authority of the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek
(ZAR). In 1882 the Pedi pretender Mampuru sought refuge amongst the Ndzundza after
having murdered his brother Sekhukhune. Nyabela’s refusal to hand him over to the ZAR
brought the wider conflicts to a head. (ibid.: 231)
The protracted Mapoch War that followed ended in 1883, when the
Ndzundza were forced to capitulate. Their tribal leadership was disrupted
with the imprisonment of King Nyabela and other members of the royal
13. The Difaqane, also called Mfecane, refers to a period, caused by colonial conquest and
tensions within and among indigenous groups, of warfare, migration and political change
within African society during the first half of the nineteenth century (see Delius, 2007:
107–111).
14. The overall Ndebele have been classified into Northern and Southern sections, of which
the Northern Ndebele subsequently came to be substantially influenced by Northern Sotho
language and cultural forms. Thus, the name ‘Ndebele’ is often used as shorthand only for
the Southern section, as is the case in this text (see Delius, 1989: 228–29).
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family. The land around the royal stronghold, situated on the farm ‘Mapochs-
gronden’ — named after the above-mentioned Ndzundza King Mabhoko—
was confiscated, subdivided and handed over to Boers who had fought in
the war (van Vuuren, 2010: 10–11). The population of the kingdom was
dispersed among the ZAR burghers — ‘in the interests of order, safety and
humanity’, as the ZAR government decreed — and indentured for a period
of five years (1883–88) (Delius, 1989: 232). This led to much arbitrary dis-
placement of Ndzundza Ndebele within the ZAR territory and ensured that
the Ndzundza, subsequently working mainly as labour tenants on white-
owned farms, would never officially regain their pre-colonial territory (van
Vuuren, 2010: 10). The incarceration of the royal family and the dispersal of
the population constituted a severe blow to the Ndzundza Ndebele, but their
imprisoned leadership managed to organize the escape of Nyabela’s brother.
Matsitsi was sent to the farm ‘Kafferskraal’ to re-establish chiefly guidance
and themale initiation ritual (ingoma), an important Ndebele institution even
today (Delius, 1989: 241; van Vuuren, 2010: 11–12).
Asmentioned above, the farm ‘Kafferskraal’ had been in white titled own-
ership since 1872 and subdivided into three separate portions with changing
owners from at least 1902. White owners never actually lived on the farm,
while generations of Ndzundza Ndebele resided and worked on ‘Kaffer-
skraal’, including Matsitsi and his chiefly successors who regularly orga-
nized male initiation schools on the farm and exercised judicial functions
there. At various points in the 1920s and 1930s, Ndzundza leaders also at-
tempted to buy a portion of ‘Kafferskraal’ from willing white sellers but
were prevented from doing so by various racially discriminatory laws (see
below). Against this backdrop, and after some changes in white ownership of
‘Kafferskraal’, most members of the local Ndebele community were finally
evicted by the late 1930s and removed to the north to the state-owned farm
Goedgedacht and surrounding areas in the Nebo district (today Limpopo
Province) which, as reserve land, later became part of the Lebowa home-
land.
This final removal constituted the end point in a long process of cumu-
lative dispossession that had started in the nineteenth century. At that time,
divergent property regimes of arriving white settlers and competing African
chiefdoms under their respective ‘customary laws’ had uneasily co-existed
until the latter’s dispossession ‘by right of conquest’ (Bundy, 1972: 379).
After the establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910, the Natives
Land Act (Act 27 of 1913) unified the somewhat divergent regulations for
African reserves and landed property in the four provinces of the Union.
It introduced racial zones of exclusive landownership and restricted black
reserves to only 7 per cent of South African land. Furthermore, it reduced
legal occupation by blacks on white farms to labour tenancy or wage labour,
thereby effectively abolishing squatting and sharecropping as successful
strategies for relatively independent African peasant farmers, thus ensuring
the supply of cheap labour to white farmers (Bundy, 1972: 384). While the
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implementation of the Natives Land Act was slow and uneven, allowing the
Ndzundza Ndebele to continue living on ‘Kafferskraal’ into the 1930s, it
still prevented them from buying a portion of ‘Kafferskraal’, as this farm
fell outside the areas designated as African reserves.
The Native Trust and Land Act (Act 18 of 1936) released additional land
for black reserves, expanding the total amount of land officially set aside for
the majority African population to (still only) 13 per cent of South African
land. The act also established the ‘South African Native Trust’ to control
the administration and acquisition of land (with public funds). The trust
became the registered owner of almost all the reserves, as a title was usually
not vested in the people who lived there (Platzky and Walker, 1985: 89).
It was in the wake of these acts that the Ndzundza Ndebele community
on ‘Kafferskraal’ was eventually removed in the late 1930s to several trust
farms in the Nebo district.
Meanwhile, a parallel system of administration for the African population
had been established. The Native Administration Act (Act 38 of 1927)
modified and consolidated the system of chiefly rule and ‘customary law’,
placing all chiefs under the Governor-General as the white ‘supreme chief’.
While the powers of chiefs were thereby to some extent restricted, their
authority in local African administration was also officially recognized, for
instance, their continuous right to control land allocation in the reserves.
Through this process, a dominant property regime in the reserves emerged
under apartheid in which de jure trust-owned land de facto turned into
the chief’s ‘property’ through his control of access to the land. This laid
the foundation for many post-apartheid conflicts with chiefs (as the case of
theNdzundzaNdebele shows below), who insist that they are the true owners
of the land.
Within this overall framework, a proclamation was published in the gov-
ernment gazette on 2 August 1957 that defined the trust farms in Nebo,
to which the Ndzundza Ndebele had been removed, as their ‘tribal area’
and established a ‘Bantu Tribal Authority’ for this Ndebele tribe under the
then Chief Poni Mahlangu, called ‘Ndebele Tribal Authority’. However,
these trust farms in Nebo became the relocation site for successive waves
of removals from the late 1930s, in which both Ndebele- and Pedi-speaking
people, mainly ex-labour tenants, were relocated from nearby white farms.
While the earlier arrivals, like the Ndzundza Ndebele who moved in at the
beginning of this period, usually managed to establish some rights to land for
ploughing, later arrivals, especially from the late 1960s onwards, were only
able to acquire residential stands (James, 1988: 36). As in other reserves,
the South African government also subjected the area to agricultural ‘Bet-
terment planning’, that is, schemes introduced since the 1930s and 1940s in
an attempt to control land usage and thus improve and rationalize reserve
agriculture (Platzky and Walker, 1985: ix). However, the Betterment
schemes in Nebo had the adverse effect of actually reducing the size and
viability of these plots: ‘In attempting to provide land for the waves of more
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recent settlers, the planners took land away from earlier settlers, rendering
them unable to produce more than a supplement to migrant wages’ (James,
1988: 36).
The growing land shortage on the trust farms contributed to local impov-
erishment and increased the dependence on the wider South African system
of labour migration, thus stabilizing the reproduction of cheap labour, upon
which South African capitalism depended (Wolpe, 1995). At the same time,
the continued expansion of both labour migration and forced removals into
the homelands led to processes of political cross-fertilization and a growing
interaction of township and rural youth from the 1970s onwards. This ef-
fected an increasing politicization also of rural areas, and youth involvement
in rebellions such as the 1986 uprisings in Sekhukhuneland/Lebowa (Delius,
1996) and the revolt in 1986 against political independence in KwaNdebele
(Phatlane, 2002).
With the demise of apartheid, different Ndzundza Ndebele groups and
individuals lodged restitution claims for ‘Kafferskraal’. After establishing
prima facie validity, the proscribed notice concerning the restitution claim
of the three portions of ‘Kafferskraal’ was published by the Regional Land
Claims Commissioner in the government gazette on 2 January 1998. The
validity of the claim was researched and the various valid claims — mostly
by individuals or nuclear families from the Ndzundza Ndebele community
under then Chief M.J. Mahlangu of the Ndebele Tribal Authority — were
consolidated. For that purpose, a land claims committee called Sibuyela
Ekhaya (We Return Home) was formed in cooperation with the chief and
his council to represent the entire Ndzundza Ndebele community with a
valid claim on ‘Kafferskraal’, on whose behalf Chief M.J. Mahlangu had
also lodged a separate land claim on 18 September 1995 regarding ‘Kaf-
ferskraal’ and sixteen neighbouring farms along the Stoffberg-Groblersdal
corridor (see also van Vuuren, 2010: 10). In the course of various stake-
holder meetings, organized by commission officers with representatives of
the claimant community and the three sets of white landowners, it became
clear that while the owner of portion 1 agreed after initial opposition to
sell his portion (as he subsequently did), the Prinsloo and Botha families,
owning portions 2 and 3 respectively, continued to contest the validity of
the claim. The Regional Land Claims Commissioner thus referred the case
to the Land Claims Court (LCC) on 19 January 2000, since no agreement
could be reached.
On the basis of extensive submissions and court hearings on 7–10 Octo-
ber, 1 November and 9 December 2002, the LCC gave a judgment on 23
December 2002 with regard to the validity of the claim by answering five
questions: first, whether there had been a community on ‘Kafferskraal’ as
contemplated in the restitution act; second, if so, whether the community had
rights in land falling under the Restitution Act; third, whether, if such rights
had existed, they had been dispossessed as a result of past discriminatory
laws and practices; fourth, whether there had been substantial compliance
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with the procedure prescribed for lodgement of claims; and fifth, whether
the claim was not excluded on the basis of a just and equitable compensation
in the past.15
In its judgment, the LCC answered all these questions in favour of the
claimant community. First, it found that although theNdundza had been scat-
tered over the area after the Mapoch War, they had retained their identity as
a distinct group, lived on the farm under tribal conditions ruled by various
chiefs, and maintained rights in land derived from shared rules determin-
ing access to land held in common. Furthermore, they left as a community
in 1939 and letters from various government authorities over a prolonged
period recognized the claimants as a community.16 Second, given that the
community had lived on the farm from at least 1883 until the late 1930s, cul-
tivated the soil, kept livestock and shared the land as a community without
any white owners occupying the farm or consistently exercising ownership
rights (except for two decades of demanding an annual rent), the court found
that the community had a restorable right in land in the form of beneficial
occupation of no less than ten years prior to dispossession.17 Third, the court
decided that the community had been dispossessed by the cumulative effect
of a number of racially discriminatory laws and practices, first turning them
into labour tenants on their own land, then preventing them from purchas-
ing the land and finally allowing for their eviction. Furthermore, the record
shows the involvement of the government in the actual relocation.18 Fourth,
the court found that, on the whole, the claim had been lodged substantially
in compliance with the legal requirements.19 Last but not least, the court
found that the relocation farm, Goedgedacht, could not have been intended
as compensation at the time, since it was explicitly declared by the gov-
ernment as only a temporary solution. The court found additional merit in
the argument by the claimants’ advocate that ‘in any case, Goedgedacht,
having been provided as part of homeland consolidation, a discriminatory
act in itself, cannot now be accepted as compensation for past discrimina-
tory acts. . . . To accept as compensation, land given in furtherance of such
policies would be tantamount to buttressing the very acts the Constitution
and the Act are intended to undo’.20 Correspondingly, the LCC found that
the claimants were entitled to restitution and granted them leave to set the
15. See the judgment of the LCC, sections 4–7, reported as Ndebele-Ndzundza Community v.
Farm Kafferskraal NO 181 JS2003 (5) SA 375 (LCC).
16. Ndebele-Ndzundza Community v. Farm Kafferskraal NO 181 JS2003 (5) SA 375 (LCC),
sections 17–18.
17. Ndebele-Ndzundza Community v. Farm Kafferskraal NO 181 JS 2003 (5) SA 375 (LCC),
section 19.
18. Ndebele-Ndzundza Community v. Farm Kafferskraal NO 181 JS 2003 (5) SA 375 (LCC),
sections 20–22.
19. Ndebele-Ndzundza Community v. Farm Kafferskraal NO 181 JS 2003 (5) SA 375 (LCC),
sections 23–28.
20. Ndebele-Ndzundza Community v. Farm Kafferskraal NO 181 JS 2003 (5) SA 375 (LCC),
section 29.
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matter down for a hearing of the remaining issues that had been excluded
pending the outcome of the trial.21
An application by the Prinsloo and Botha families for leave to appeal
against the whole of the LCC judgment was granted on 17 February 2004
by the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA). In its judgment on 31 May 2005,
the SCA dealt with four issues: first, whether the claimants were a commu-
nity as contemplated in the act; second, if so, whether the community had
restorable rights in land; third, whether the community was dispossessed as
contemplated in the act; and fourth, whether the claim was not excluded on
the basis of a just and equitable compensation in the past.22
The SCA, again, principally confirmed the validity of the claim. First, it
found that the claimants constituted a community as defined in the restitu-
tion act since these Ndzundza Ndebele continuously lived and worked on the
farm for at least fifty years under tribal authority, held the land in common
with each other, occupied the farm exclusively without immediate supervi-
sion or direct control of the white landowners, and did so under Ndzundza
Ndebele traditions, as the telling fact shows that Matsitsi was explicitly sent
back to ‘Kafferskraal’ in the 1880s in order to re-establish male initiation
rites.23 Second, the court emphasized that the restitution act put forward a
broad definition of ‘rights in land’, going far beyond formal ownership and
including customary law interests and rights of labour tenants and sharecrop-
pers. Without further specifying the exact nature of their former land rights,
the SCA found that the claimants had certainly exercised rights no less than
those recognized in the act.24 Third, the court confirmed that there had been
a dispossession as contemplated in the act, emphasizing that the absence of
a physically forced removal did not mean that there was no dispossession.
The court stated that the community was not given a real choice, as people
had to relocate and live and work under changed conditions there or stay on
the farm as labour tenants under significantly changed conditions.25
However, regarding the fourth question, whether the claim was excluded
due to just and equitable compensation in the past, the SCA found that the
LCC had erred. The SCA noted that the LCC had argued that no just and
equitable compensation had occurred, since the relocation farm had been
intended only as a temporary measure (while de facto becoming permanent)
and, since being part of the racially discriminatory practice of homeland
consolidation, could not now be accepted as a legitimate compensation in
21. Ndebele-Ndzundza Community v. Farm Kafferskraal NO 181 JS 2003 (5) SA 375 (LCC),
section 36.
22. Prinsloo & Another v. Ndebele-Ndzundza Community & Others 2005 (6) SA 144 (SCA).
23. Prinsloo & Another v. Ndebele-Ndzundza Community & Others 2005 (6) SA 144 (SCA),
sections 11–31.
24. Prinsloo & Another v. Ndebele-Ndzundza Community & Others 2005 (6) SA 144 (SCA),
sections 32–40.
25. Prinsloo & Another v. Ndebele-Ndzundza Community & Others 2005 (6) SA 144 (SCA),
sections 41–49.
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the past. The SCA found that neither the Restitution Act nor the constitution
provided any basis for excluding past compensation on such grounds. The
SCA thus ordered that the issue of past compensation be remitted to the LCC
for further consideration, when dealing with the remaining issues that had
been excluded from the original LCC trial.26
In light of having lost their overall appeal, the Prinsloo and the Botha fam-
ilies decided not to pursue the case further to the level of the Constitutional
Court. Instead, they reached a settlement with the claimants that was made
an order by the LCC on 21 August 2006, in which all parties consented to
the transfer of the two remaining ‘Kafferskraal’ portions on the following
principal condition: ‘that the value of the rights in land that the community
had in respect of the farm “Kafferskraal” 181 JS prior to dispossession,
and the compensation, if any, that the community received as a result of
the dispossession of such rights, shall be taken into account’27 when the
outstanding claims by the same community regarding the above-mentioned
sixteen neighbouring farms (several portions of which are also owned by
the two families) are adjudicated by the LCC. On this basis, the remaining
two portions of ‘Kafferskraal’ were subsequently bought for the claimant
community. However, when I last researched this case (February 2012) the
outstanding sixteen claims were still being processed by the Regional Land
Claims Commissioner and had not yet reached the LCC. It remains to be
seen how the contested issue over just and equitable compensation in the
past will be dealt with by the court.
THE CONTESTED JUSTICE OF THE ‘KAFFERSKRAAL’ LAND CLAIM
When I talked to different members of the Sibuyela Ekhaya committee,
they evidently felt that finally justice had been done in restoring their for-
mer right in land and upgrading it to full ownership in order to redress
the injustice of their dispossession in the past. However, some procedural
injustices remained. As claimants complained, despite the LCC order in
2006, the official transfer of the remaining two portions of ‘Kafferskraal’
was further delayed until 2010 by protracted negotiations between the for-
mer white owners and the state regarding the price for the acquisition of
the land. And while the state finally bought the remaining two portions in
2010, the claimants still did not know (when I last spoke to them in Febru-
ary 2012), when they would receive the new title deeds. As Mr Shabangu,
the committee chairman, explained to me, these delays unduly prolonged
26. Prinsloo & Another v. Ndebele-Ndzundza Community & Others 2005 (6) SA 144 (SCA),
sections 51–56.
27. See section 2.3 in the settlement agreement, attached as Annexure X to the unreported
judgment of the LCC, in re Ndebele-Ndzundza Community regarding the farm Kafferskraal
181 JS, Case No. LCC 03/2000, 21 August 2006.
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the claimants’ insecure tenure and precarious situation, as they continued
to be unable, for instance, to prove to banks or private investors that the
land actually belonged to them. Mr Shabangu further complained about the
insufficient post-settlement support, which the Department of Land Affairs
is supposed to offer all restitution beneficiaries in order to enable them to
turn their restored land into sustainable sources of income.
Major problems have also persistedwith the royal council of theNdzundza
Ndebele Chief Poni II Mahlangu in Nebo, whose predecessor, the late M.J.
Mahlangu, had lodged a separate claim for ‘Kafferskraal’ and sixteen neigh-
bouring farms.28 As I learnt in interviews and conversations with members
of the Ndebele Tribal Authority, they felt that the Sibuyela Ekhaya com-
mittee had ‘stolen’ their claim on ‘Kafferskraal’ and the other sixteen farms
within the restitution process. Against the backdrop of the above-mentioned
dominant property regime in the reserves under apartheid — when the
chief, as the state-backed allocator of reserve land, had acted as its de facto
owner — members of the royal council further demanded, in conflict with
current state law such as the Communal Property Associations Act (Act 28
of 1996), that the land should in any case be owned and managed directly
by the chief, as he was ‘the true owner’ of the land under ‘customary law’.29
Therefore, intra-communal strife was much more prevalent in my encoun-
ters with the various claimants than the still rather abstract problem that the
issue of past compensation might (at least partly) undermine all Ndzundza
Ndebele claims on the other sixteen farms in the future.
By contrast, the former white owners — that is, members of the Prinsloo
and Botha families — were rather bitter about what they saw as the injus-
tice that the trial had done them. As illustrated by the introductory vignette,
I learnt in various conversations that land restitution as such was seen as
morally right, but only when landowners with title deed had been dispos-
sessed, as was the case in the infamous ‘black spot removals’ of black titled
landowners. All over the world, it was claimed, ownership existed only with
proper title deed, yet in South African restitution, people could claim a right
in land simply because they had lived on the land for longer than ten years.
In the case of ‘Kafferskraal’, the outcome was perceived as profoundly un-
just, as the farm had been in white titled ownership since 1872 and, in the
case of the Botha family, even in direct family ownership long before the
1913 cut-off date. Generally speaking, it was argued, local African people
had lost their rights in land long before the 1913 cut-off date during the
nineteenth century wars of conquest. The white government had still com-
pensated them subsequently by setting aside land in the reserves, and yet
28. Interviews with various members of the Sibuyela Ekhaya committee on 7 September 2010,
5 November 2010, 25 August 2011, 2 September 2011, 13–14 February 2012.
29. Interviews with the royal council of the Ndebele Tribal Authority in Nebo, and its various
members, on 30 August, 6 September, 25 October 2010, 24 August 2011, 31 January and
15 February 2012.
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new farms were nevertheless claimed in recent years. Furthermore, as Mr
Botha Snr explained:
When the claim was made, at the first meeting, we were told ‘the claim is not against you as
a person, it is against the state’. But when it came to the case, I had to pay my own lawyers,
while the state was on the side of the claimants. So I do not understand how it is not against
us, if we have to pay our costs! I had to prove against the state that the portion of Kafferskraal
is my property. I thought that this wasn’t fair. We had to prove out of our own pockets that
it was our own land, for which we had title deeds and everything.30
This evidently showed, it was argued, that South African land restitution
was neither a just process nor based on a just law; instead it was a political
process and a political court, as it was not about giving land back to the
rightful owners, who had been dispossessed, but exclusively about handing
over land to Africans for political reasons. Only the fact that the SCA had
ordered to take past compensation into account when adjudicating the claim
on the remaining sixteen farms was seen as, at last, constituting some form
of justice.31
This diametrical opposition in the evaluation of the in/justice of the out-
come in the ‘Kafferskraal’ case can be traced back to a fundamental dif-
ference in opinion regarding the legitimacy of alternative property regimes.
The former white landowners continued to propagate a narrow concep-
tion of exclusive, formal ownership that is unified, hegemonic and elevated
above other less comprehensive rights, which has until recently largely been
supported by South African property law (Mostert, 2010: 69–70). In this
interpretation, earlier African ‘owners’ of ‘Kafferskraal’ had been dispos-
sessed long before 1913, therefore the restitution claim fell well outside the
scope of the Restitution Act. In keeping with their conception of ownership,
these former white owners advocated a broader understanding of past com-
pensations, in which Africans with no ownership rights were ‘compensated’
in the course of their removal with rights in land regarding the relocation
farms.
By contrast, the claimant community put forward a broad conception of
their right in land regarding ‘Kafferskraal’ — framed as ‘beneficial occu-
pation’ (rather than ‘a customary law interest’) by their lawyers in terms of
the restitution act — which they had retained despite the superimposition
of both the white registered title and state-backed property regime in the
reserves. Their ultimate dispossession therefore occurred after the 1913 cut-
off date and was thus clearly within the ambit of the restitution process. It
follows that to describe their removal to the trust farms as a form of compen-
sation was at best cynical, and at worst an impertinence. In the claimants’
understanding of past compensation (informed by their conception of land
30. Interview with members of the Botha family, 11 October 2010.
31. Interviews with members of the Prinsloo and Botha families, 2 February, 11 September and
11 October 2010.
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rights), relocating them made final their dispossession as opposed to consti-
tuting compensation.
As discussed above, the LCC followed the claimants in their interpretation
of their former rights in land and their subsequent dispossession, while also
rejecting an interpretation of the relocation farms as a form of past compen-
sation. The SCA overruled this judgment concerning past compensations,
yet upheld the LCC’s decision to interpret rights in land broadly. As Hanri
Mostert shows with reference to recent case law, especially regarding the
Richtersveld land claim,32 but also ‘Kafferskraal’, decisions by the LCC,
the SCA and the Constitutional Court have significantly transformed and
broadened core concepts of land ownership, representing ‘a major turn in
South African jurisprudence on land rights’ (Mostert, 2010: 62–4, 67, 76).
This may be illustrated by two core statements in the SCA judgment on
‘Kafferskraal’, which declare that ‘the fact that registered title exists neither
necessarily extinguishes the rights in land that the statute [the restitution
act] contemplates, nor prevents them from arising’ and that ‘[t]he statute
also recognises the significance of registered title. But it does not afford it
unblemished primacy’.33
In view of the massive racially motivated land dispossessions of the
past, these extraordinary transformations in the conception of South African
landownership are seen as a restoration of justice by state officials in the com-
mission and the courts, and land claimants alike. In other words, these actors
invoke a logic of exceptionality that highlights amassive breakwith humane,
desirable normality which demands and justifies the extraordinary measures
of land restitution in exceptional times. Given that the former government
is responsible for past dispossessions through its own laws, they cannot eas-
ily be redressed in terms of the former legal categories of ‘property’ and
‘ownership’, since these made dispossession possible in the first place. Thus
sometimes referred to as ‘transformation legislation’ (Walker, 2008: 5), land
restitution is seen as constituting a transformative legal counter-violence or
‘law-making violence’, to borrow Walter Benjamin’s term, which estab-
lishes new property law that remains necessarily and intimately bound to
violence under the title of state power (Benjamin, 1996: 248).
However, from the point of view of former white landowners, who insist
on an earlier and unchanged conception of exclusive formal ownership, such
legal transformations and the judicial outcomes they make possible seem
illegitimate and deeply unjust. In other words, far from making restitution’s
law-making logic of exceptionality their own, these former owners believe
32. See Richtersveld Community and Others v. Alexkor (Pty) Ltd and Another 2001 (3) SA
1293 (LCC); Richtersveld Community and Others v. Alexkor (Pty) Ltd and Another 2003
(2) All SA 27 (SCA); and Alexkor (Pty) Ltd and Another v. Richtersveld Community and
Others 2004 (5) SA 460 (CC).
33. See Prinsloo & Another v. Ndebele-Ndzundza Community & Others 2005 (6) SA 144
(SCA), sections 36 and 38.
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they have unmasked land restitution as actually following the perfectly
ordinary logic of ‘victor’s justice’. For them, land restitution represents
a redistribution of goods based on political considerations rather than a
remedy based on the manifest victimhood of individual beneficiaries. On the
one hand, these former owners thus advocate a logic of the ordinary with
regard to the ‘true’ nature of land restitution, which implies a continuity of
an alleged political bias of the former anti-apartheid movement against white
farmers. On the other hand, this ‘unmasking’ is intimately linked to another
logic of the ordinary, which insists on the rightfulness and hence legal
continuation of the former conception of exclusive formal ownership that
prevailed under apartheid. Taken together, these two logics of the ordinary
combine in a ‘law-preserving violence’ (Benjamin, 1996)which is concerned
with the protection of the legal principles, and the still skewed patterns of
landownership made possible by them, underpinning the former state of
landed property.
In short, the continuing discrepancies regarding the legitimacy of the
various property regimes which inform the different evaluations of ‘the
justice’ of this land claim are ultimately rooted in an incompatibility between
the law-making logic of exceptionality that drives the restitution process
and the law-preserving logics of the ordinary, as accentuated by former
landowners. Hence, a transition to justice does not take place for all, because
some actors involved cannot agree that land restitution should ultimately
bring about a truly ‘new law against an old state’.
CONCLUSION: NEW LAW AGAINST AN OLD STATE
South African land restitution conforms closely to Ruti Teitel’s definition of
‘transitional justice’, which is concerned with a ‘conception of justice asso-
ciated with periods of political change, characterized by legal responses to
confront the wrongdoings of repressive predecessor regimes’ (Teitel, 2003:
69). South Africa’s post-1994 land restitution process can thus be discussed
as a form of transitional justice, even though research and public debate on
the topic with regard to South Africa has focused almost exclusively on the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) (Zenker, 2011: 2–3).
Taking into account the result of this case, and rethinking South African
land restitution in terms of transitional justice, it becomes possible to throw
into sharper relief the potential and limitations of land restitution to facilitate
a transition towards a more just South Africa. As shown, land restitution is
based on a law-making logic of exceptionality which is invoked and enacted
by the state. While being similar to Agamben’s state of exception declared
by the sovereign, there are two important differences. First, as a transitional
justice measure, land restitution consciously marks a threshold between two
substantially different regimes, while explicitly addressing an old state of
injustice (in both senses of the phrase) through developing new law within
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an equally transformed framework of legality (such as a new constitution)
rather than merely suspending the law. Land restitution thus differs from
the paradigmatic ‘state of exception’, given that it is by necessity concerned
with establishing ‘new law against an old state’.34
Second, in order to achieve the transitional justice goals of justice and
reconciliation, land restitution’s law-making logic of exceptionality must
succeed in winning over broad societal support for its project. However, a
de facto sovereign, in its successful enforcement of the state of exception, is
not truly dependent upon legitimacy. This highlights the importance of not
only focusing on the inner logic of transitional justice. Instead, it is crucial
to situate concrete transitional justice measures within wider local, that is,
‘place-based’ (Shaw et al., 2010), debates on various logics of exceptionality
and the ordinary that are seen as being ‘really’ behind these measures (see
Anders and Zenker, 2014). Put differently, given the multiple logics of
exceptionality and the ordinary with which transitional justice measures
locally co-exist and often conflict, the relative success of ‘transitional justice’
also crucially depends on its capacity, over time, to win over a broadmajority
of actors to share its definitions of ‘justice’ and ‘reconciliation’.
As the case study of the ‘Kafferskraal’ land claim showed, South African
land restitution clearly succeeded with regard to the first point, developing
a significantly transformed (property) law against an old state of landed in-
justice. However, regarding the second point of securing broad support for
its law-making logic of exceptionality, land restitution, relatively speaking,
failed— at least in this case. It did not succeed in bringing about a transition
towards a situation that was widely interpreted as exhibiting more justice
than before, since the former landowners stuck to their own law-preserving
logics of the ordinary. While such broad-based support is admittedly always
difficult to establish, I will end with a brief reflection upon one peculiar
feature of South African land restitution that makes this support-building
endeavour even more difficult, namely the absence of any explicit require-
ment for a face-to-face interaction and reconciliation between current owner
and claimant.
This is not to say, of course, that the interested parties do not meet during
the restitution process. Stakeholder meetings with all interested parties do
take place, and also happened in the ‘Kafferskraal’ case. However, their
purpose is to inform parties about the existence of a land claim and to
attempt to settle the claim by agreement. Their aim is not to explain the law-
making logic of exceptionality that informs land restitution.Much discontent
regarding the in/justice of restitution outcomes possibly springs from the
34. The most concise example of this principle can possibly be found in subsection (3)(b) of the
equality clause (section 8) of the Interim Constitution of 1993: ‘Every person or community
dispossessed of rights in land before the commencement of this Constitution under any law
which would have been inconsistent with subsection (2) [of this equality clause prohibiting
unfair discrimination] had that subsection been in operation at the time of the dispossession,
shall be entitled to claim restitution of such rights . . . .’
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fact that white landowners often expect restitution to operate as an ordinary
process within an unchanged property system, whereas, in fact, it is driven
by an exceptional process of a new transformative property regime. The
likelihood of achieving a more congruent and widely shared understanding
of this processwould be considerably improved if restitution institutionalized
a much more substantive engagement between current owner and claimant.
In this way, a mutual sharing of histories of possession and dispossession
could lead to greater understanding and more ‘common sense’ — that is,
more consensual understandings of history and justice, and thus, ultimately,
to more reconciliation.
There is no guarantee, of course, that such an approach would always
succeed. The divergent sense of entitlement of African claimants and white
owners might prove to be irreconcilable. African claimants may completely
reject any sense of legitimate white ownership, thus possibly dismissing
the latter’s constitutional right to just and equitable compensation when the
state returns the land. Similarly, the families of current owners may have
lived on or farmed the claimed lands for several generations and may have
developed an equal sense of belonging and entitlement, which could make it
difficult to transcend their earlier conception of exclusive formal ownership.
Furthermore, given the judicialized nature of the restitution process, an open
exchange about what the different parties regard as historical fact may be
unlikely when parties are in actual dispute and little incentive exists to reveal
such ‘evidence’ to their opponents.
Although it might be difficult to achieve ‘common sense’ between par-
ties under such judicialized conditions, a process that incorporates a much
stronger element of face-to-face interaction between the different parties,
in which the existence and legitimacy of property regimes other than those
formerly accepted by the colonial state are made explicit, would still stand a
better chance of achieving reconciliation and more consensual understand-
ings of justice than is currently the case. Such a shared understanding and
support for a ‘new law against an old state’ — which ultimately summarizes
the transitional justice project of restitution’s law-making logic of excep-
tionality — is crucial for South African land restitution in order to better
achieve a transition to a state of more justice for all.
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